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Contextual Religious Education and the Interpretive Approach 
Robert Jackson 
 
Abstract 
This article responds to Andrew Wright’s critique of my views on the representation 
of religions. Using various literary devices – associating my work closely with that of 
others whose views are in some ways different from my own, referring very selectively 
to published texts and exaggerating, and sometimes misrepresenting, what I actually 
say – Wright presents my work as dualistic, nominalist and as not genuinely 
hermeneutical. Wright contrasts what he sees as my extreme idea of religions as 
‘constructions’ with his own view of them as ‘social facts’. My reply illustrates and 
responds to Wright’s account of my work, clarifies my own position, and raises 
questions about Wright’s views, especially in relation to those of Gavin Flood, whom 
he cites with favour. My conclusion includes the suggestion that, although our 
epistemological positions are different in some ways, they spawn pedagogies utilizing 
some common principles and values.  
 
Keywords: interpretive approach, contextual approach, representation, construction, 
social fact, religion, religions, groups, tradition  
 
Introduction 
 
Andrew Wright offers a critique of an aspect of my work, namely my views on the 
representation of religions in religious education (Wright, 2008). I have to say that I 
do not recognise much of his portrait. It functions to distance the author from 
contextual approaches to religious education in general (portraying me as their 
defender) and what he sees as my views on the representation of religions in 
particular. By the use of various literary devices – associating my work closely with 
that of others whose views are in some ways different from my own, referring 
selectively to my published work and exaggerating, and sometimes plainly 
misrepresenting, what I actually say – Wright presents my work as dualistic, 
nominalist (at the far end of the nominalist-idealist spectrum), as strongly 
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constructivist (religions are not constructions, but „fragile constructions‟ or „arbitrary 
constructions‟) and as not genuinely hermeneutical. He claims, for example, that my 
position involves „the nominal reduction of discrete religious traditions to the 
atomistic level of the individual spiritual lives of adherents‟ (Wright, 2008, p. **). 
Wright contrasts what he sees as my extreme idea of religions as „constructions‟ with 
his own view of them as „social facts‟.1  
Contextual religious education 
In his introduction, Wright quotes from one of my editorials in the British Journal of 
Religious Education (Jackson, 2004a), stating that my comments reflect the 
emergence of a „contextual‟ approach to religious education that focuses on the 
immediate life-worlds of children and seeks to help them negotiate their sense of 
personal identity. In identifying this approach, Wright presents some brief quotations 
from Heimbrock, Sheilke and Schreiner‟s anthology of essays entitled Towards 
Religious Competence: Diversity as a Challenge for Education in Europe 
(Heimbrock, Sheilke and Schreiner, 2001). The quotations are unattributed and, in 
terms of the content of the book as a whole, highly selective.
2
 In a volume that 
presents some very different kinds of papers from people who clearly do not share 
identical views on the nature and practice of religious education, Wright infers a 
movement called „contextual religious education‟. He goes on to state that his article 
is a critique of my defence of contextual religious education. The impression is given 
that I belong to a school of thought which I set out to defend through my own work. 
This is not so. Although I belong to a research workshop called the European 
Network for Religious Education through Contextual Approaches (ENRECA), I do 
not sign up to the views of any particular movement or school of thought. ENRECA 
has members with some interestingly different views. I am very interested in context, 
both pedagogically and in representing others (especially in avoiding stereotyping), 
but my work is not presented as a „defence of contextual religious education‟. Thus, 
Wright‟s rhetorical technique involves manufacturing a school of thought, presenting 
me as its defender and then distancing himself from it.  
 
Moreover, Wright‟s initial quotation, which he puts forward as my criticism of the 
treatment of religions in the Non-statutory National Framework for Religious 
Education, is from remarks made about the concept of cultures, not religions. The use 
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of the quotation to illustrate my views on religious education is a misrepresentation. 
In the editorial in question, I welcome the draft National Framework (Jackson, 2004a, 
p. 221). Neither of my critical comments is about the representation of religions: one 
is about learning („it is a pity that there has not been some deeper thinking about 
hermeneutical learning‟ (p. 220)), and the other (which Wright quotes) is about 
cultures, not religions (p. 220).  
The representation of religions 
Wright then turns to some of my writing about the representation of religions. He 
acknowledges that I do not propose the „wholesale deconstruction of religious 
traditions‟, but that I hold that „reference to particular religions as complex, organic, 
constantly changing and internally diverse entities can still be used as a useful 
heuristic tool through which to explore the life-worlds of religious adherents…‟ 
(Wright, 2008, p. **). Wright is correct in my characterisation of religions, but wrong 
in suggesting that they serve only as heuristic tools to illuminate individual experience 
or that I reduce religious traditions „to the atomistic level of the individual spiritual 
lives of adherents‟.  
 
On the first point, I do think that it is possible to give general descriptions of religions, 
and indeed have done so, but such descriptions should not be regarded as final or 
uncontested, in the same way that a biography, however well researched and written, 
is not a final or uncontested account. Because a biography is not comprehensive, and 
may contain interpretations which might be disputed, it does not follow that the work 
is empty of descriptive content or has no value as a historical source. The case of 
religious traditions is similar. In Religious Education: An Interpretive Approach, I 
dealt specifically with the potential charge of reductionism, pointing out that my view 
of the internal diversity of religious traditions does not challenge the existence or 
importance of religious „wholes‟ (Jackson, 1997, p. 126). I go on to illustrate this 
(Jackson, 1997, p. 127) by reference to my own overview of „Hinduism‟ or the Hindu 
tradition as given in Approaches to Hinduism (Jackson & Killingley, 1988, pp. 11-20; 
see also Jackson & Nesbitt, 1993, pp. 2-4). I will summarise the points made in my 
overview in order to drive home the fact that it contains a good deal of descriptive 
content.
3
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In attempting the overview, I drew on a range of disciplines and various scholarly 
studies (including regional and local studies), developing the image of the banyan tree 
as a metaphor for the Hindu tradition. The multiple roots of the tree have been struck 
in many different soils throughout the Indian subcontinent. The tree trunk includes 
important concepts (dharma, karma, kāma, artha, moksha, samsāra etc), social 
structures (the institution of caste), and practices and beliefs (daily and seasonal 
rituals, the samskāras [life cycle rites], worship [eg pūjā and bhajan] and festivals as 
well as meritorious acts, such as „fasting‟ [vrat] and pilgrimages). I note that, although 
Hindus are restricted in the realm of conduct, they are relatively free in the domain of 
belief. However, I point out „tendencies‟ in belief, such as the notion of brahman, the 
impersonal Absolute that pervades the universe, noting that the fact that brahman is 
considered immanent as well as transcendent leads to a pantheistic tendency in 
Hinduism. Equally there is a tendency to personalise the divine, as bhagavān, for 
example, so there is also a strong monotheistic current in the tradition. It is not 
contradictory for a person to affirm „God is one‟ (bhagvān ek hai) while making 
offerings to several deities. There is also the notion of ishta-devatā, or „chosen deity‟, 
worshipped by a person as the supreme God, while not denying the reality of other 
gods. The main branches of the tree are the three main theistic strands of the tradition, 
Vaishnavism, Shaivism and Shāktism, while the many minor branches and twigs are 
the diverse beliefs and practices found in village India, where much attention is given 
to village deities (grāma-devatās), who, while lacking the great power of the devas, 
can affect individuals‟ welfare positively or negatively. 
 
The point of the metaphor and the overview is neither to present the essence of 
Hinduism nor solely to provide an interpretive tool. The overview is presented as a 
provisional „way in‟, a preliminary to gaining a deeper understanding. It is not simply 
a heuristic tool; it conveys a good deal of information, but it is information that needs 
qualification and exemplification. This is what the main body of the book does. Ten 
themes are taken and illustrated by examples of individuals, in the context of groups 
of various kinds, portrayed through ethnographic studies, biographies or 
autobiographies. The individual studies are examined in relation to the overview in a 
fully hermeneutical way, revealing both its usefulness and its limitations, and bringing 
a diverse tradition to life through a range of examples from life. 
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I also discuss whether the term „Hinduism‟ is a useful term or whether it would be 
better simply to drop it (as Wilfred Cantwell Smith suggests [Smith, 1978]), whether 
the tree metaphor is appropriate at all or whether Indian tradition is perhaps better 
pictured as a collection of different plants. I opt for keeping the terms „Hinduism‟ and 
„Hindu tradition‟, but using them critically, with plenty of qualifications – presenting 
the tradition as a diversity linked by family resemblances and shared traits. Thus, 
what I am presenting is a „construction‟, but not one empty of descriptive content. The 
view of learning promoted in the book (as in the Warwick RE Project texts for 
students [listed in Jackson, 1997, for example]) is hermeneutical. The provisional 
„whole‟ gives some preliminary understanding, while the illustrative examples show 
the inadequacies of the „whole‟ as an account of „essential‟ beliefs, values and 
practices, yet modify and deepen the general understanding of tradition. It is the 
continuing review of new examples from the tradition – of individuals interacting and 
communicating with others – in relation to the overview that brings learners into the 
debate, deepens understanding, and shows there is always more to learn or debate.  
The importance of groups 
On the second point – the accusation of reducing religious traditions „to the atomistic 
level of the individual spiritual lives of adherents‟ (Wright, 2008, p. **) – my points 
above partly respond to this, but so does what I have to say about groups. Wright 
ignores my advocacy of „more personal accounts which link individual experience to 
social experience‟ (Jackson, 1997, p. 69, my italics). He conveniently sidesteps what I 
have to say about „membership groups‟, a notion he dismisses since I also discuss the 
influence of power on the representation of groups and traditions. Wright says: 
 
Though membership groups constitute significant features of religious 
traditions, the fact that they are driven by the exercise of power has a 
profoundly destabilising effect on our attempts to describe religious identity. 
Ultimately, we have no access to the religions themselves, only to flawed 
representations constructed by groups and individuals with particular interests 
to defend. (Wright, 2008, p. **) 
 
Here is another example of Wright‟s rhetorical technique. I mention power as a factor 
in group relations. Wright exaggerates this to imply that I say that groups are driven 
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by the exercise of power. This is taken as a reason to disregard completely what I have 
to say about groups (I will discuss the issue of power later). Wright thus distorts my 
discussion of both traditions and membership groups, and ignores the research on 
groups supporting it (summarised in Jackson, 1997, pp. 97-104). It is clear from what 
I say in Religious Education: An Interpretive Approach, and the body of ethnographic 
research that underpins it, that groups are of different, sometimes overlapping, types 
(sub-traditions, „streams‟, denominations, ethnic groups, sects and movements, castes, 
families, peer groups etc [Jackson, 1997, pp. 64-5]). They are not simply „individuals 
within their local contexts‟ as Wright claims (2008, p.**). Moreover – and this is the 
crucial point – groups are communicative. It is at the group level that social and 
linguistic interaction occurs, and that tradition is communicated. The ethnographic 
data from Warwick research projects relate to religion as a social activity. Groups 
provide the context for the processes of „transmission‟, „nurture‟ and „socialisation‟ 
we were investigating. 
 
In terms of Hindu tradition, for example, the processes of religious learning are 
interactive and take place in social contexts (Jackson & Nesbitt, 1993). Within the 
family, children learn mother tongue and family roles, participate in domestic 
worship, practise vrats (fasts associated with vows) and other rituals, celebrate 
festivals, absorb traditions regarding food, watch films and videos with religious 
themes, listen to stories etc. In wider social situations, children participate in language 
and religion classes, temple worship, festivals (including singing, dancing and 
instrumental music) and other public rituals and ceremonies (Jackson & Nesbitt, 
1993; see also Jackson, 1997, pp. 97-98; Jackson & Nesbitt, 1996). Although this 
experience is in the context of groups – family, caste, religious movement, language 
class etc – it places children firmly within Hindu tradition, and hardly presents them 
as having a „fragile sense of communal identity‟. The wealth of research material 
referred to here shows that groups themselves are not isolated, but reverberate with 
one another and often overlap (eg family, caste, religious movement, ethnic group).
4
 
 
It also should be noted that processes of „transmission‟ take place within a matrix of 
both traditional and modern plurality. Young people interacting with parents, 
community leaders, peers from the same background, texts, spiritual teachers etc also 
interact with other sources of value, and the types and degrees of interaction may vary 
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over time. A ten year old girl who drew on the spirituality of the Sathya Sai Baba 
organisation and on a range Gujarati Hindu traditions was additionally finding 
inspiration from non-Hindu spiritual sources by the time she was in her late teens, for 
example (Jackson, 2004b, p. 91). 
Transcendence, contest and power 
Wright suggests that I weaken further a „fragile understanding of communal religious 
identity‟ by adding three qualifications to Smith‟s view of tradition. These are:  
 „effectively bypassing transcendent belief as one possible source of religious 
identity‟ (Wright, 2008, p. **);  
 claiming that the scope of religious traditions is contested – he claims that my 
view is that, „the best we can hope to do is to construct representations whose 
significance cannot extend beyond the heuristic task of illuminating individual 
spiritualities‟ (his italics) (Wright, 2008, p.**);  
 claiming that the process of defining and encompassing a religious tradition is 
governed by power relations between the parties concerned (Wright, 2008, p. 
**).  
 
His conclusion is that I claim that religious traditions are „merely the accidental sum 
of individual spiritualities, they are human constructs existing “in name only”‟ 
(Wright, 2008, p. **) and that „the representation of religions in the classroom is a 
useful activity only insofar as it sheds light on the contextual lives of their adherents‟ 
(Wright, 2008, p. **). What I have said above in relation to tradition and groups 
responds to Wright‟s general point. I will deal with his three specific points in turn: 
 
Firstly, he concludes that in rejecting Smith‟s concept of faith, I am „effectively 
bypassing transcendent belief as one possible source of religious identity‟. Here is the 
passage to which Wright refers: 
 
Although Smith uses it (the term ‘faith’) in a novel and technical sense, it still 
carries associations from its history in Christian thought, and inherently 
implies a personal relationship. Despite Smith‟s comments on the multifarious 
ways in which faith can be expressed, the term does not quite fit the range of 
activities that might be said to constitute a person‟s spiritual experience…In 
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the discussions which follow, we will refer to „the individual‟ rather than to 
„personal faith‟, concentrating on the individual‟s language, experiences, 
feelings and attitudes in a religious context, but taking account of the influence 
of other types of group. (Jackson, 1997, p. 62) 
 
Wright reads this passage as „effectively bypassing transcendent belief as one possible 
source of religious identity‟. It is clear from the text (pp. 62-3) that this was not my 
intention. I chose not to use the term „faith‟ as a technical term in order to avoid 
imposing a Western and mainly Christian concept on to other traditions.
5
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„individual‟s language, experiences, feelings and attitudes in a religious context‟ 
include those relating to the transcendent (see, for example, Nesbitt & Jackson, 1995). 
The expression „faith‟ – in Smith‟s case associated with a specific Christian 
theological position – is simply regarded as inappropriate as an analytical tool with 
respect to religious plurality.  
 
Secondly, Wright addresses my view that Smith fails to give attention to 
disagreements over boundaries of any given tradition.  
 
… Jackson questions Smith‟s failure to attend to disagreements over the 
boundaries of any given tradition. He draws attention to scholarly disputes 
over the classification of religious traditions, to the ways in which traditions 
are perceived differently when viewed from differing socio-cultural contexts, 
to the fact that readings of traditions may be modified as a result on new 
encounters with them, and to the difference between the perspectives of 
„insiders‟ and „outsiders‟. This makes it impossible to provide robust 
representations of religious traditions, since „the precise nature of a tradition 
will be a matter of negotiation or even contest‟ (p. 63). Because 
representations resulting from such negotiations can never adequately describe 
socio-cultural reality, the best we can hope to do is to construct 
representations whose significance cannot extend beyond the heuristic task of 
illuminating individual spiritualities. (Wright, 2008, p. **) 
 
As indicated above, despite boundary disputes, I do think that it is possible to describe 
religions, but they are not final or uncontested descriptions. I have also noted 
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Wright‟s view (in his concluding sentences) that we should develop representations of 
religious worldviews that remain „provisional and open to further revision‟. Since 
Wright holds this view, he himself must recognize the reality of boundary disputes. 
 
The heart of Wright‟s argument lies in his distinction between „construction‟ and 
„description‟: With regard to my views, he says, „Because representations resulting 
from such negotiations can never adequately describe socio-cultural reality, the best 
we can hope to do is to construct representations‟. Since Wright devotes more space 
to discussing this distinction later in his article, I will take the issue up later, clarifying 
what I mean by „construction‟. 
 
With regard to Wright‟s third point about power, he shifts deftly from my regarding 
power as a factor in the construction of knowledge to its being „the driver‟. In doing 
this he changes my position from a humanistic, critical perspective to a deconstructive 
stance. My actual position is that, in analysing a representation of a religion or group, 
one should be alert to the interests of those making the representation, and equally 
alert to voices within a tradition (those of women or children or marginalised caste 
groups, for example) which may be not easily be heard (Said, 1978; see also Jackson, 
1997, pp. 55-57).  
 
In the context of religious education, there are examples of powerful groups 
(sometimes government agencies or insider groups) using their power to exclude, 
marginalise or misrepresent some groups or traditions or to promote the interests of 
others. For example, powerful „insider‟ groups may represent religions in textbooks in 
ways which further their particular interests, promoting a particular view of a religion 
(Jackson, 2007b, p. 210 gives the example of Hindu textbook writers with a particular 
ideological stance representing Hinduism as inclusive of Sikhism and Buddhism). 
Similarly, loaded accounts of religions or religious groups can be disguised as 
„objective‟ accounts. For example, recent analyses of the subject „Culture of 
Religions‟ in schools in the Russian Federation show how what is represented by the 
authorities as a non-confessional subject is used to promote nationalism and 
traditional Orthodox belief (Willems, 2007). James Nelson‟s account of the 
manipulation of choices within religious education in Northern Ireland is another 
example (Nelson, 2004). Japanese education presents a further case, in which Satoko 
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Fujiwara argues that an avowedly non-confessional programme can, in reality, be 
politically loaded, in this case cryptically promoting Shinto ethnocentrism through 
textbook writing (Fujiwara, 2007). None of these examples suggests that 
representations are entirely or even primarily shaped by power, but all illustrate how 
powerful bodies might distort or misrepresent material in their own interests. The 
attention to issues of power in the interpretive approach is intended to provide checks 
and balances against such loaded representations, not to imply that traditions are 
„arbitrary constructions‟ devoid of descriptive content. 
Dualism and nominalism  
In a section headed „Jackson‟s Dualistic Assumptions‟, Wright sets out to present 
religious traditions as „robust social facts‟. He starts by claiming to uncover the 
philosophical assumptions underlying my argument. He represents my philosophical 
position as both dualist (in Derrida‟s sense of binary thinking, of interpreting entities 
as either one thing or another) and (since I am supposed to be a dualist who can only 
think in terms of two possible alternatives when interpreting data) nominalist – that is, 
I take the view (says Wright) that reality consists of nothing more than the sum of 
particular objects existing in arbitrary relationship with one other. Having placed me 
as close to the deconstructive pole as he can, Wright then presents his own critical 
realist path (in contrast to my supposed dualist, nominalist position) as steering a 
steady course between the extremes of idealism and nominalism. This position allows 
the development of descriptions of social and cultural reality, rather than making the 
assumption (as I am pictured as doing) that social descriptions (like those of religions) 
are „merely arbitrary constructions‟.  
 
In writing about my critique of his own position, Wright says „Jackson suggests two 
possible interpretations of my position‟ (my italics) (Wright, 2008, p. **). He uses 
this single example to justify his assertion that my thinking is dualistic. The passage is 
as follows: 
 
One wonders how Wright would classify these children or those British 
Anglican Christian children whose belief in reincarnation is documented in 
Leslie Francis‟s research (Francis 1984: 75). With regard to the latter, would 
Wright help them to understand that their belief was perhaps (though not 
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necessarily) a synthesis of Indian and Christian ideas, or would he feel a duty 
to wean them off unorthodoxy? (Jackson, 2004a, p. 83) 
 
From this Wright infers: 
 
Jackson‟s misreading of my position can be attributed to his tendency to think 
in dualistic terms: either my reference to discrete religious traditions is merely 
a heuristic tool, or I am guilty of essentialising and reifying them. (Wright, 
2008, p. **) 
 
Although I suggest two ways in which Wright might respond, I do not say or mean 
that these are the only „two possible interpretations‟ he might make. Other 
possibilities include attempting to find out from what sources the children had learned 
the idea or eliciting whether the children had simply made a mistake. The inference of 
philosophical dualism or binary thinking on my part, on the basis of this single 
comment is remarkable. My work is suffused with examples of non-binary thinking. 
Anyone who has read it would know that expressions such as „either she is a 
Hindu/Christian/Sikh or she is not‟ would be unlikely to pass my lips. Responses such 
as „…it depends what you mean by Hindu/Christian/Sikh …‟ would be rather more 
likely! 
 
Wright‟s unwarranted accusation of binary thinking on my part leads him to an 
excursus into Derrida on dualism. 
 
[Derrida] argues that we frequently make dualistic distinctions between 
entities – subject/object, sacred/secular, central/marginal, essential/nominal, 
pure/contextual etc. As I have noted elsewhere, Derrida claims that such 
distinctions „encourage superficial arguments based on simplistic either/or 
choices and constrain the way we think by inviting us to privilege one side of 
the equation and marginalise the other‟ (Wright, 2004, p. 33). My suggestion 
is that Jackson‟s reading of my work is dependent on just such binary 
thinking. (Wright, 2008, p. **) 
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Wright gives no evidence beyond the single remark referred to above to support his 
„suggestion‟. However, he goes even further, in a discussion of the distinction 
between nominalism and idealism, and proceeds to project a nominalist position on to 
my work. He cannot place me at the extreme of the nominalist/idealist spectrum 
(since I explicitly reject antirealism), so he associates me with the nominalist pole. 
„Pushed to its logical extreme, nominalism takes a post-modern turn that reduces 
reality to the arbitrary language games through which we construct imaginary worlds‟ 
(Wright, 2008, p. **). Elsewhere – by sidestepping what I say about groups – he goes 
further, claiming that my view is that religious traditions are „merely the accidental 
sum of individual spiritualities‟ (Wright, 2008, p. **). Having associated me with the 
nominalist extreme, Wright can then say „the conflict between idealism and 
nominalism (sets) the parameters of the debate, and consequently of imposing a false 
choice between essential descriptions of religions as unified wholes and nominal 
descriptions of their fragmented parts‟ (Wright, 2008, p. **). I am presented as 
exemplifying the latter. However, I have already demonstrated that I do not regard the 
only alternative to essentialism as „the religiosity of individuals within their local 
contexts‟ or religions as „the accidental sum of individual spiritualities‟.  
Construction 
Having asserted that in my work, social descriptions (like those of religions) are 
„merely arbitrary constructions‟ (Wright, 2008, p. **), Wright goes on to propose 
„critical description‟ as an alternative to „construction‟. According to Wright, since 
my account of religions (or religious traditions) „contains no descriptive content‟, I 
have „no alternative but to construct accounts of the religions, and to assess their 
validity by appealing to a consensus amongst the various interested parties, rather 
than considering the extent to which they adequately describe socio-cultural reality‟ 
(Wright, 2008, p. **). To Wright what remains unclear in my account „is the extent to 
which a constructed representation… is capable of accurately reflecting socio-cultural 
reality‟ (Wright, 2008, p. **).  
 
The result of Jackson‟s re-reading of Smith is a rejection of the notion of 
religions as „bounded and uncontestable systems‟, and the limiting of their 
identity „to the various constructions of each religious tradition made by 
different insiders and outsiders‟ (p. 64, my italics). ). Religious traditions do 
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not enjoy any substantial formal or structural identity: as merely the accidental 
sum of individual spiritualities, they are human constructs existing „in name 
only‟. (Wright, 2008, p. **) 
 
Wright projects a particular view of constructivism on to my work, despite the fact 
that there are wide variations in the use of the terms constructivism and 
constructionism in the literatures of the social sciences and cultural studies (Velody & 
Williams, 1998). A radical or universal constructionist view, for example, might 
assert that social reality consists entirely of text and discourse (eg. Gergen, 1999). 
With regard to religion and social construction, Peter Berger takes the very specific 
view that humans have a basic need to resist chaos through the social construction of 
sacred frames of meaning (Berger, 1969). When I refer to different constructions of 
religion or religions I am saying something different from both of these. I am neither 
advancing an anti-realist view, nor am I making universal claims about religion as a 
human construct. I am simply recognising, as with other broad patterns of social and 
cultural life, such as „work‟, „family‟, „politics‟, „childhood‟, „law‟, „marriage‟ and 
„art‟, that „religion‟ and „religions‟ are social and cultural constructs the meaning of 
which has changed over time, varies in different cultural situations, and has never 
been universally agreed. To call a religion a „construct‟ in this sense no more denies 
its meaning or „reality‟ than using the term „family‟ flexibly to refer to related but 
different structures of kinship in different societies and how these understandings 
change over time under the influence of a variety of factors. It is this meaning of 
social and cultural construction that I take in my own work, and it is similar to that 
adopted by James Beckford in his work on social theory and religion (Beckford, 
2003).
6
  
Social facts and collective intentionality  
Wright employs John Searle‟s idea of collective intentionality, „the fact that human 
beings engage together in cooperative behaviour and share intentional states‟, to 
distinguish between behaving individualistically in a group situation and mutually 
engaging in a common task. He gives some musical examples to illustrate that the 
central element in collective intentionality is the sense of deliberately acting together, 
and then applies the distinction to religion:  
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…it is not the sum of the individual intentionalities of those who identify 
themselves as Muslim that produces Islam, but rather the collective 
intentionality of the Muslim community as a whole. Islam, that is to say, is far 
more than simply the sum of its parts. (Wright, 2008, p. **) 
 
Searle‟s view is that collective intentionality predicates „social facts‟ rather than 
„social constructions‟. „It follows from this‟, says Wright, „that the world‟s religions 
constitute robust and substantial social facts rather than fragile and arbitrary social 
constructions‟ (Wright, 2008, p. **).  
 
Searle‟s idea of collective intentionality is interesting, as is Wright‟s discussion of it 
in the context of religions. In particular, the parallel between „collective‟ musical 
performance and religions is worthy of further analysis. For the moment, I would 
make three critical points for further discussion and development.  
 
Firstly, I would suggest that analyses of empirical research are very likely to show 
that experience of collective intentionality in a religious context is far more common 
in „group‟ contexts than in the context of „whole‟ religions. With regard to our 
research on Hindu children in Britain, for example, I have given (above) various 
examples of mutual engagement in a common task, rather than „behaving 
individualistically in a group situation‟ (Jackson & Nesbitt, 1993). In contrast, there 
are all too many examples showing a distinct lack of collective intentionality when 
religions are looked at as „wholes‟. For example, there are many intra-religious 
conflicts, some of which have been or are bitter and bloody, placing a question mark 
by collective intentionality in relation to religions as wholes.  
 
Secondly, the assertion that individual intentionality „is both derived from and 
dependent upon collective intentionality‟ needs further discussion. Novelty and 
creativity can also come from individuals in group situations, whether in music or 
religion, thus accounting for certain kinds of innovation within groups. For example, 
the creativity and influence of certain individuals in bringing about the bebop 
„revolution‟ in the jazz of the 1940s is unquestionable, even though the musical 
„grammar‟ of bebop soon became a matter of collective understanding and expression. 
 
 15 
Thirdly, the precise status of Wright‟s application of Searle‟s idea of a „social fact‟ 
remains unclear to me. Wright adopts Searle‟s distinction between „social fact‟ and 
„social construction‟; but Searle‟s understanding of social construction is a very 
particular one (Searle, 1995), and is certainly different from my own stance. In short, 
what is the relationship between Wright‟s view of a „social fact‟ and my view of a 
„social construction‟? 
The debate about ‘religions’ in religious studies 
In developing the idea of religions as robust social facts, Wright makes use of Gavin 
Flood‟s definition of religions. Wright approves of the fact that Flood „rejects the 
extremes of essentialism and relativism‟, defining religions etymologically as „value-
laden narratives and behaviours that bind people in their objectivities, to each other, 
and to non-empirical claims and beings’ (Flood, 1999, p. 47). Wright then gives the 
example of Flood‟s use of „prototypical features‟, applying the idea to his own view 
of religions as „social facts‟.  
 
Wright does not discuss the implications of his acceptance of Flood‟s ideas. Flood‟s 
definition and general approach, like mine, is an attempt to get „behind‟ the inherited 
assumptions of comparative religion and phenomenology whilst retaining a 
meaningful and flexible way of discussing „religion(s)‟ cross-culturally. Wright‟s 
assumption is that my own position is quite different from that of Flood. Scrutiny of 
the broader debate about „religions‟ shows my own and Flood‟s positions to be 
closely related.  
 
There are a number of broad positions in the debate about the concepts of „religion‟ 
and „religions‟ in the field of religious studies. At the extreme is the family of views 
that deconstructs religions(s) completely. A good example of this is Timothy 
Fitzgerald‟s book The Ideology of Religious Studies (2000). Fitzgerald systematically 
rejects all models for representing religion(s). Through an analysis of various „world 
religions‟ academic texts, and through a rigorous discussion of religion in relation to 
India and Japan, he reaches the conclusion that religions are „non-existent objects‟ 
and that, consequently, religious studies can claim no distinctive identity as a 
discipline and should be re-configured as a branch of cultural studies (Fitzgerald, 
2000, pp. 221-234).  
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Another position sees the categories of „religion‟ and „religions‟ as originating in the 
West and having a particular history (the terms are used and applied differently over 
time, especially since the European Enlightenment and in the history of comparative 
religion). They continue to be useful analytical categories in relation to sets of beliefs, 
practices, experiences and values dealing with fundamental existential questions, such 
as those of birth, identity and death. The terms may have no direct semantic 
equivalent across languages and cultures, but they relate usefully to phenomena 
exhibiting family resemblances, and sharing a transcendental reference. This position 
differs from the phenomenological one in that no essence of religion, expressed 
through common systematic structures exhibited by individual religions, is posited. 
However, some degree of transcendental reference is a common feature, although 
different specific meanings are given to this idea.  
 
Gavin Flood‟s views (1999) are a variant of this broad position, as are my own 
(Jackson, 1997, 2003, 2004b, 2007a). My own views are identical to Flood‟s in a 
number of ways, including: 
 seeing religion as a category with fuzzy edges and in recognizing that „there 
will always be disputed boundaries‟ in the case of religions (Flood, 1999, p. 
48). 
 recognizing that religions are, at least in part, constructions: „the object of 
enquiry is recognized as being a construction…we recognize religion when we 
see it, but must reflexively be aware that our recognition partly constructs it‟ 
(ibid).  
 regarding religion as a category, not with membership dependent on necessary 
and sufficient conditions, but linked through family resemblance (ibid). 
 regarding religions as having some kind of transcendental reference (in 
Flood‟s terms, reference to „non-empirical claims and beings‟) (Flood, 1999, 
p. 47). 
 regarding a focus upon central issues of human life to be characteristic of 
religions (Flood, 1999, p. 49) 
 regarding religions as „communicative processes‟, conveying information to 
human recipients, although the process of communication is usually 
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unintentional (ie most people simply „grow up‟/are socialized in their inherited 
traditions) (Flood, 1999, p. 51) 
 recognizing contemporary transformations of religion in the context of the 
forces of globalization and localization (Flood, 1999, pp. 51-52) with moves 
towards individualization (eg. post-modern syntheses) on the one hand, and 
towards religious authority (eg. fundamentalisms) on the other (p. 53). 
The status of religions as ‘social facts’ 
If Wright is serious about accepting Flood‟s general approach to the representation of 
religions, he must also acknowledge a degree of interpretation and construction in the 
idea that religions are „social facts‟. Wright accepts that, like him, I am not an anti-
realist (although he associates me with this view). In clarifying our epistemological 
views in relation to religions, much hinges on my actual use of terms such as 
„construction‟, rather than Wright‟s account of them, and on what he means precisely 
by expressions such as „robust social facts‟, „substantial social facts‟, „socio-cultural 
reality‟, and „critical description‟.  
 
Neither of us is an anti-realist. Equally, neither of us is a naïve realist, believing that 
we directly perceive the world exactly as it is. Thus, both our epistemological views 
have to be somewhere between the two positions. Epistemologically speaking, 
Wright‟s view is a version of critical realism. The underlying principle of this seems 
to be that humans do not experience „reality‟ independently of the human observer, 
but as it appears to observers through their distinctively human cognitive means of 
perception. Thus, critical realism seems to be compatible with interpretation, and 
therefore with some forms of constructivism.  
 
However, Wright‟s claim that „the ongoing scholarly struggle (is) to develop 
evermore accurate descriptions of the religions‟ (Wright, 2008, p. **) suggests he 
might consider there to be some final and undisputed account of religions that can be 
uncovered by scholarship. My view is different; the fact that religions elude 
straightforward description testifies to the richness of texture and abundance of 
reality. Traditions such as „Hinduism‟ cannot be comprehensively and finally 
described, not because they are not „real‟, but because they cannot be encapsulated in 
a single set of words. Our descriptions are not inventions. However, like biographies, 
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with sources edited and crafted by individuals at specific times in particular contexts, 
they cannot fully capture reality. 
Conclusion 
With reference to my own work, and also to the caricature of it presented in Wright‟s 
article, I have attempted to clarify my own views on the representation of religions. In 
conclusion, it is worth pointing out that, although there are some important 
differences in our views, there is also scope for further discussion and clarification. 
Moreover, whatever our differences, we share a commitment to a number of key 
principles and values in religious education. For example, both of us seek to devise 
pedagogies that do not to impose our own epistemological views on pupils studying 
religion in schools. In this regard, I talk about „epistemological openness‟ (eg. 
Jackson, 1997, pp. 125-6), and Wright affirms that religious education should help 
students to clarify and formulate their own views (eg. Wright, 1996). Also, both of us 
take an inclusive approach to religious education, regarding the subject and its open 
exploration as available to all students, regardless of their religious or secular views 
(Jackson, 1997, 2004b, 2007a; Wright, 2006).  
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1
 There is no space available to summarise the interpretive approach to religious education. Accounts 
of the approach can be read, for example, in Jackson, 1997, 2004b Chapter 6, and 2006. 
 
2
 The first is from a paper by the Norwegian researcher Heid Leganger-Krogstad, the second from the 
German scholar Heinz Streib, writers with different positions whose work deserves specific attention. 
 
3
 The fact that Western influences on some portrayals of „Hinduism‟ can be exposed does not preclude 
attempts at more nuanced general accounts of Hindu tradition that try to get behind inter-textually 
transmitted assumptions and structures (see Jackson, 1996 for a discussion of the literature on Western 
influences on the formation of the concept of „Hinduism‟). 
 
4
 Moreover, the hermeneutical process of comparing examples with the general description outlined 
above does provide criteria for discussing the relationship of particular examples to the wider tradition. 
(See, for example, Arweck, Nesbitt & Jackson, 2005). 
 
5
 The use of Western and often Christian concepts when discussing other traditions was a feature of 
some writing in the phenomenology of religion (Jackson, 1997, pp. 14-29). 
 
6
 In projecting other meanings of social construction on to my work, Wright is highly selective in his 
citations. For example, he does not refer to the following passage which refers specifically to the stance 
on „social construction‟ taken within the research project „Ethnography and Religious Education‟ and 
its associated curriculum project „The Warwick RE Project‟: 
 
Does our approach, with its underlying critique of the ways „religions‟ have been represented 
in much Western literature, imply a view that knowledge is socially constructed, with „truth‟ 
being relative to each constructed way of life? It is certainly the case that our project assumes 
that at least some aspects of knowledge are „socially constructed‟… This is different from 
asserting that all knowledge is socially constructed and that the notion of „ultimate truth‟ has 
no meaning. (Jackson, 1997, p. 125) 
